4457: The Theory of Industrial Organization ( efterår 2010 - 10 ECTS )
Rammer for udbud
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Uddannelsessprog:
engelsk
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Niveau:
COURSE LEVEL: Optional MSc/IMSQE course
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Semester/kvarter:
SEMESTER FOR WHICH THE COURSE APPLIES: Fall 2010
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Timer per uge:
NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK: 4 (2 + 2) in 12 weeks
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Deltagerbegrænsning:
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Undervisningssted:
Århus
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Hovedområde:
Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet
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Udbud ID:
23349
Formål
LEARNING OBJECTIVES:
Upon completion of the course the student should be able to apply advanced tools from microeconomic theory to analyze incentive problems within imperfectly competitive markets. In particular the student should be able to
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solve standard models of imperfect competition
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solve standard problems involving asymmetric information;
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reflect on the theoretical properties of these models;
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generalize some of the simplifying assumptions made in practical applications.
Indhold
COURSE DESCRIPTION:
This course is intended for Economics and Management students interested in deepening their understanding of incentives and the organization of firms and markets. The course applies a consistent set of tools to understand firms' behaviors, and students taking this course will improve their economic reasoning skills using these tools. In addition, students will improve their ability to apply and interpret systematic modeling of economic behavior. The course will also assess the social efficiency implications of firms' behaviors and provide examples and cases to which the concepts and tools developed can be applied.
COURSE SUBJECT AREAS:
This course focuses on the external relations of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. As such, the main emphasis is on models of oligopoly behavior and the topics covered include the following: 1. Monopoly; 2. Static models of oligopoly; 3. Product selection; 4. Product differentiation; 5. Dynamic models of oligopoly and collusion; 6. Strategic behavior: entry, accommodation, exit; 7. Information and strategic behavior.
Faglige forudsætninger
REQUIRED COURSES:
The course assumes a solid foundation in microeconomic theory as well as basic notions of non-cooperative game theory (e.g. through Micro 1/BA or comparable courses).
Underviser
LECTURER: Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Undervisnings- og arbejdsform
TEACHING METHOD: Weekly lectures of 4 hours for 12 weeks. Optional problem sets will be handed out.
TEACHING LANGUAGE: English
Litteratur
LITERATURE:
The main text is:
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Jean Tirole, 1989,
The Theory of Industrial Organization
, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
and we will refer to parts of the following articles:
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Bagwell, K. and A. Wolinsky (2003), "Game theory and industrial organization", Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3, Chapter 49 (ed. R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig).
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d'Aspremont C., J. Gabszewicz and J-F. Thisse (1979), "On Hotelling's `Stability in Competition´, Econometrica, Vol. 47 (5), pp. 1145-1150.
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Deneckere, R. and C. Davidson (1985), "Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition",
RAND Journal of Economics
, Vol. 16, n. 4, pp. 473-486.
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Dixit, A. (1979), "A model of oligopoly suggesting a theory of barriers to entry".
Bell
Journal of Economics
, Vol. 10, n. 1, pp. 20-32.
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Dixit, A. (1980), "The role of investment in entry deterrence".
Economic Journal
, Vol. 90, n. 357, pp. 95-106.
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Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro, 1990, "Horizontal mergers: an equilibrium analysis",
American Economic Review
, Vol. 80, n.1, pp. 107-126.
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Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1984), "The fat-cat effect, the puppy-dog ploy, and the lean and hungry look",
American Economic Review - Papers and Proceedings
, Vol. 74, n. 2, pp. 361-66.
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Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in Competition", The Economic Journal, Vol. 39, pp. 41-57.
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Kreps D.M. and J.A. Scheinkman, 1983, "Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 326-337.
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Milgrom, P. and J: Roberts (1982), "Limit pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: an Equilibrium Analysis",
Econometrica
, Vol. 50, n. 2, pp. 443-460.
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Perry, M. and R. Porter, 1985, "Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger",
American Economic Review
, Vol. 75, n. 1, pp.219-227.
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Shapiro, C. (1989), "Theories of oligopoly behavior", Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 1, Chapter 6 (ed. R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig).
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Stigler, G. (1964), "A theory of oligopoly",
Journal of Political Economy
, Vol. 72, n. 1, pp. 44-61.
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N. Gregory Mankiw; Michael D. Whinston, "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,"
The RAND Journal of Economics
, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Spring, 1986), pp. 48-58.
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Salop Steven C., "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,"
The Bell Journal of Economics
, Vol. 10, No. 1. (Spring, 1979), pp. 141-156
Total reading: Not exceeding 450 pages.
Bedømmelse
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Skriftlig, bedømt efter 7-skala med intern censur
5 xxxxx
FORM OF ASSESSMENT: Written examination of 4 hours duration
EXAMINATION AIDS ALLOWED: Only dictionaries (no electronic dictionaries allowed)
