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Micro 1 ( forår 2008 - 10 ECTS )

Rammer for udbud

  • Uddannelsessprog: (se under Undervisnings- og arbejdsform)
  • Niveau: Optional BSc and MSc course  
  • Semester/kvarter: Every spring
  • Timer per uge: 4 lectures and 1 tutorial per week for 12 weeks
  • Deltagerbegrænsning: None
  • Undervisningssted: Århus
  • Hovedområde: Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet
  • Udbud ID: 10926

Formål

The students should be able to

Part I

  • Formulate economic problems as proper formal game forms, solve and analyze them
  • Reflect upon the information structure of a problem

Part II

  • Reflect upon the equilibrium concepts and their relevance for a given economic problem
  • Reflect upon the main problems caused by asymmetric information
  • Formulate, solve and analyze economic models of contracts and reflect upon the underlying assumptions
  • Generalize the models to real economic environments

Indhold

 

The purpose of the course is to build upon and extend the introductory analyses considered in previous microeconomic courses. The course consists of two parts an introduction to game theory and an introduction to the economics of asymmetric information.

The study of game theory will provide tools that can be used in a wide range of situations: firms competing for market share, bidders participating in auctions, the role of threats, rewards, and punishments in long-term relationship.

The second part of the course will introduce students to informational asymmetries and their effects in a contracting setting (i.e. the market imperfections that information asymmetries introduce, and how contracts can partially deal with those problems). Applications of information economics are widespread; e.g. industry regulation, employee remuneration schemes, insurance, pricing decisions, and voting schemes.

 

COURSE SUBJECT AREAS:

 

Topics in game theory:

  • Static games under complete information and applications
  • Dynamic games under complete information and applications
  • Static games under incomplete information and applications
  • Dynamic games under incomplete information and applications

Topics in contracts and asymmetric information

  • The Principal-Agent problem
  • Moral hazard and incentives and applications
  • Adverse selection: Hidden information and screening and applications
  • Adverse selection and signaling and applications

Faglige forudsætninger

The course assumes a solid foundation in microeconomic theory as well as the basic notions of non-cooperative game theory (acquired through the microeconomic courses during the first two years of the BA degree or comparable courses).

 

Underviser

Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa

Undervisnings- og arbejdsform

Lectures and tutorials with active student participation. Problem sets following each topic (8 in total).

English

Litteratur

  • Gibbons, R. (1992). A Primer in Game Theory , Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead: UK . (circa 250 pages)
  • Bolton , P., and Dewatripont, M. (2005). Contract Theory , The MIT Press. (Chapters 1 4) (circa 180 pages)
  • Lecture notes (circa 150 pages)

 

A total of approx. 580 pages

Studieordning og bedømmelse

Bacheloruddannelsen i økonomi

  • Skriftlig, bedømt efter 7-skala med intern censur

Grundfaget i erhvervsøkonomi

  • Skriftlig, bedømt efter 7-skala med intern censur


4-hour written exam. At least 6 problem sets (including at least 2 out of three for the second part of the course) must be handed in and approved in order for the students to be admitted to the exam.

 

 

EXAMINATION AIDS ALLOWED: Danish -English, English-Danish dictionaries no electronic dictionaries are allowed