[Forside] [Hovedområder] [Perioder] [Udannelser] [Alle kurser på en side]
LEARNING OBJECTIVES:
Having completed this course the students will be able to
• Analyze economic issues related to the marriage market
• Reflect on the different theoretical and empirical methods that are used to analyze family economic situations
• Formulate and analyze economic models of the family.
COURSE DESCRIPTION:
This course will provide insight to how the family works and how the functioning of the marriage market can be analysed using economic and econometric tools similar to those economist use when they describe other economic markets.
We provide a neo-classical analysis of how rational agents act in the marriage market. That is, we try to answer the following questions: why do people marry? Whom do they marry? Do they get kids? Will they eventually divorce? within an economic framework.
COURSE SUBJECT AREAS:
1. Why marry?
2. Who marries whom?
3. Matching markets - imperfect information and search frictions
4. Fertility
5. Divorce
6. Consequences of divorce
7. Marriage Premium
8. Marriage and health
9. Marriage and crime
10. Prostitution.
REQUIRED COURSES:
None.
LECTURER:
Michael Svarer.
TEACHING METHOD:
Four lectures per week. When lectures are done the students will (preferably in groups) produce an assignment. The assignment should be based on the material covered by the lectures and is limited to approximately 15 pages per student.
LITERATURE:
Yoram Weiss (1997): The Formation and Dissolution of Families: Why Marry? Who Marries Whom? and What Happens Upon Divorce, Handbook of Population Economics.
Gary S. Becker (1973): A Theory of Marriage, Part I, Journal of Political Economy, 82(4), 813-846.
Gregory Hess (2004): Marriage and Consumption: What's Love Got to Do with It, Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 290-318.
Ken Burdett and Melvyn Coles (1999): Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment, Economic Journal, 109, p.307-334.
Helena Skyt-Nielsen & Michael Svarer (2009): Educational Homogamy: Preferences or Opportunities?, forthcoming Journal of Human Resources.
Pieter Gautier, Michael Svarer & Coen Teulings (2009): Marriage and the City, Manucsript, University of Aarhus.
Hotz, V. J., J. Klerman, and R. Willis (1997): The Economics of Fertility in Developed Countries: A Survey, in M.R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark, editors, Handbook of Population and Family Economics, North Holland.
Black, S. E, P. J. Devereux, and K. G. Salvanes (2005): The More the Merrier? The Effect of Family Size and Birth Order on Children's Education, Quarterly Journal of Economics (120), 669-700.
M. Simonsen, L. Skipper, and J. Smith (2009): Birth Order Effects and the Quantity-Quality Trade-off, Manuscript, University of Aarhus.
Michael Svarer (2005): Two Tests of Divorce Behaviour on Danish Marriage Market Data , Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift (Danish Economic Journal), 143(3), 416-432 .
Michael Svarer (2004): Is Your Love in Vain? Another Look at Premarital Cohabitation and Divorce, Journal of Human Resources 39(2) 523-536 .
Michael Svarer and Mette Verner (2008): Do Children Stabilize Danish Marriages? , Journal of Population Economics, 21, 395-417.
Michael Svarer (2007): Working late: Do Workplace Sex Ratios Affect Partnership Formation and Dissolution?, Journal of Human Resources , 42(3), 583-595 .
P. Gautier, M. Svarer and C. Teulings (2007) : Sin City? , Working Paper 2007-01.
Jonathan Gruber (2004): Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce, Journal of Labor Economics, 22(4), 799-833.
Anders Björklund and Marianne Sundström (2006): Parental Separation and Children's Educational Attainment: A Siblings Analysis on Swedish Register Data, Economica , 73, 605-624.
Donna Ginther and Madeline Zavodny (2001): Is the Male Premium due to Selection? The Effects of Shotgun Weddings on the Return to Marriage, Journal of Population Economics, 14, 313-328
Kate Antonovics and Robert Town (2004): Are All the Good Men Married? Uncovering the Sources of the Marital Wage Premium. . American Economic Review , May, Vol. 94 Issue 2, p317-321.
M. Bitler, J. Gelbach, H. Hoynes and M. Zavodny (2004): The Impact of Welfare Reform on Marriage and Divorce, Demography , 41(2), 213-236.
D. Anderberg (2008): Tax Credits, Income Support, and Partnership Decisions, International Tax and Public Finance , 15, 499-526.
Articles amount to approx. 600 pages.
FORM OF ASSESSMENT:
Oral exam based on project report (20 min.). The weight of the oral exam is 1/3 and the weight of the project report is 2/3.
EXAMINATION AIDS ALLOWED: The project report.
