2950: Advanced Microeconomic Theory ( forår 2009 - 10 ECTS )
Rammer for udbud
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Uddannelsessprog:
engelsk
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Niveau:
COURSE LEVEL: MSc and PhD level course.
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Semester/kvarter:
SEMESTER FOR WHICH THE COURSE DESCRIPTION APPLIES: Spring 2009.
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Timer per uge:
NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK: 4 lectures hours for 12 weeks.
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Deltagerbegrænsning:
RESTRICTIONS ON ADMISSION: None.
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Undervisningssted:
Århus
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Hovedområde:
Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet
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Udbud ID:
15631
Formål
LEARNING OBJECTIVES:
Upon completion of the course the student should be able to apply advanced tools from microeconomic theory to analyze problems with asymmetric information. In particular the student should be able to
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solve standard problems from mechanism design, auction, principal agent and matching theory;
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reflect on the theoretical properties of these models;
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generalize some of the simplifying assumptions made in practical applications.
Indhold
COURSE DESCRIPTION:
The purpose of this course is to expose the student to formalized treatments in microeconomic theory at a deep level. The focus will be on theoretical tools needed to set up and analyze game theoretic models of markets and mechanism design problems.
The student is expected to have a reasonable knowledge - often at the Masters level - of game theory and microeconomics. In particular, the course will assume a familiarity with solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, dominant strategy equilibrium, and subgame perfection, as well as with asymmetric information problems and principal-agent models.
Topics:
1. Bargaining with Asymmetric Information
2. Auctions
3. The Principal-Agent Model with a Continuum of Types
4. Matching.
Faglige forudsætninger
REQUIRED COURSES:
Micro 1 and Micro 2
Underviser
LECTURER:
John Kennes and Alexander Koch.
Undervisnings- og arbejdsform
TEACHING METHOD:
Lectures.
Litteratur
LITERATURE
The course is organized around key journal articles and lecture notes. The student is expected to read the following articles
:
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Abdulkadiroglu, A. and Sonmez, T. (2003). "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach,"
American Economic Review
93, 729-747.
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Cremer, J. and McLean, R. (1985). "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent,"
Econometrica
53, 45-362.
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Gale, D. and Shapley, L. (1962). "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,"
American Mathematical Monthly
69, 9-15.
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Hatfield, J.W. and Milgrom, P.R. (2005). "Matching with Contracts,"
American Economic Review
95, 913-935.
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Kelso, A. and Crawford, V. (1982). "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes,"
Econometrica
50, 1483-1504
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Myerson, R.B. and Satterthwaite, M.A. (1983). "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading,"
Journal of Economic Theory
29, 265-281.
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Muthoo, A. (2001) The Economics of Bargaining, mimeo, University of Essex
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Nöldeke, G. and Samuelson, L. (2007). "Optimal bunching without optimal control,"
Journal of Economic Theory
134, 405 - 420.
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Weiss, Y and A. Willis (1985) Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements,
Journal of Labor Economics
, 3, 268-292.
There is no main text book, but the course will also draw on the following textbooks:
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Mas Colell A., M. Whinston and J. Green (1995).
Microeconomic Theory
, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Milgrom , P. (2004).
Putting Auction Theory to Work
, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayor (1992).
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
, Cambridge University Press.
Note:
There may be a few additional readings
Bedømmelse
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Hj.opg., bedømt efter 7-skala med intern censur
5 xxxxx
FORM OF ASSESSMENT: 7-point grading scale (Take-home assignment)
