AU kursuskatalog arkiv

2950: Advanced Microeconomic Theory ( forår 2010 - 10 ECTS )

Rammer for udbud

• Uddannelsessprog: engelsk
• Niveau: COURSE LEVEL: MSc and PhD level course.  
• Semester/kvarter: SEMESTER FOR WHICH THE COURSE DESCRIPTION APPLIES: Spring 2010  
• Timer per uge: NUMBER OF HOURS PER WEEK: 4 lectures hours for 12 weeks.  
• Deltagerbegrænsning: RESTRICTIONS ON ADMISSION: None.  
• Undervisningssted: Århus
• Hovedområde: Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet
• Udbud ID: 17526

Formål

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

Upon completion of the course the student should be able to apply advanced tools from microeconomic theory to analyze problems with asymmetric information. In particular the student should be able to

• solve standard problems from mechanism design, auction, principal agent and matching theory;
• reflect on the theoretical properties of these models;
• generalize some of the simplifying assumptions made in practical applications.

Indhold

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

The purpose of this course is to expose the student to formalized treatments in microeconomic theory at a deep level. The focus will be on theoretical tools needed to set up and analyze game theoretic models of markets and mechanism design problems.

The student is expected to have a reasonable knowledge - often at the Masters level - of game theory and microeconomics. In particular, the course will assume a familiarity with solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, dominant strategy equilibrium, and subgame perfection, as well as with asymmetric information problems and principal-agent models.

1. The Principal-Agent Model with a Continuum of Types

2. Topics in Auction Theory

3. Topics in matching Theory

Faglige forudsætninger

REQUIRED COURSES:

Micro 1 and Micro 2

Underviser

LECTURER:

John Kennes and Alexander Koch.

Undervisnings- og arbejdsform

TEACHING METHOD:

Lectures.

Litteratur

LITERATURE

The course is organized around key journal articles, textbook chapters, and lecture notes:
• Hatfield, J.W. and Milgrom, P.R. (2005). "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review 95, 913-935.
• Kelso, A. and Crawford, V. (1982). "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica 50, 1483-1504
• Nöldeke, G. and Samuelson, L. (2007). "Optimal bunching without optimal control," Journal of Economic Theory 134, 405 - 420.
• Krishna, Vijay (2002). Auction Theory, New York: Academic Press.
The course will also draw on the following supplementary textbooks:
• Mas Colell A., M. Whinston and J. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayor (1992). Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge University Press.
Note: There may be a few additional readings
Total: Approx. 200 pages

Bedømmelse

• Hj.opg., bedømt efter 7-skala med intern censur
5 xxxxx

FORM OF ASSESSMENT: Take-home exam.