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Learning objectives
Upon completion of the course, the students should be able to :
• Apply empirical evidence to formulate human resource policies in firms.
• Formulate empirical models to analyze human resource policies in firms.
• Compare, relate and reflect on the different empirical methods that are used to analyze human resource management and human resource policy in firms. Describe which identifying assumptions the empirical approaches rely on.
• Apply the analytical and empirical tools in an independent empirical analysis of a specific problem related to the topics covered.
The focus in this course is on issues from recent research in empirical economics which are applicable in practice in everyday human resource decisions of human resource managers, CEOs and other managers.
The course addresses students with an interest in evidence based human resource policies. The course embraces both students with an interest in Economics and Management, and complements courses such as human resource management, organizational behaviour, organizational change and development, organizational economics, labor economics, economics of education and applied microeconometrics. In
contrast to the mentioned courses, this course focuses on empirical analyses of human resource issues within firms.
We will seek the answer to questions such as: Why should wages vary across workers within the firm? How compressed should the pay structure be? Should firms pay workers according to their skills, effort and abilities or their performance? Do CEOs unintended discriminate by gender or race? Why do firms promote and who are promoted? Would a diverse workforce improve firm performance? Would a diverse board/management improve firm performance? Why do firms use teams? Can we use social interactions at the work place to improve firm performance? What are the causes and consequences of sickness absence - and how can sickness absence be reduced?
The choice of topics varies according to the most recent research agenda in the empirical economics literature on HRM issues. The focus will be on studies of the causal impact of relevant factors such as sickness absence, peers and family on firm performance. This means that the conclusions are directly applicable in human resource and managerial decisions.
The course applies an empirical economic approach to selected topics within human resource management in firms. Human resource decisions and behavior is based on the assumption of optimizing agents while allowing for discriminatory preferences, social interaction, peer pressure and additional individual factors.
Course subject areas:
1. Introduction
2. Pay, Promotion and Performance
3. Executive compensation
4. Gender and top executive positions
5. Risk, competition and pay
6. The effect of diversity of board and management on firm performance
7. The effect of diversity of workforce on firm performance.
8. Team work
9. Absenteeism and incentives
10. Absenteeism and the work environment
11. Social interaction and productivity.
12. Social interaction and other factors
BSc Economics and Management
Nina Smith and Helena Skyt Nielsen
When the 12 lectures are done the students will (preferably in groups) produce a written assignment. The assignment should be based on the material covered by the lectures and is limited to 15 pages per student.
Literature (Litteratur): (In total: About 625 pages + optional literature)
E. Lazear and K. Shaw (2007), The economist's view of human resources, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4), 91-114
Bloom, N. and J. van Reenen (2007), Measuring and Explaining Management Practices across firms and countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4): 1351-92 (selected pages)
Lazear, E. P. (2000), Performance Pay and Productivity, The American Economic Review, 90(5), 1346-1361
Smeets, V., F- Warzynski and Coupe, T. (2006), "Does the Academic Labor Market Initially Allocate new Graduates Efficiently?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(3) 161-172.
Murphy, K. (1999), Executive Compensation, Handbook of Labor Economics, ch. 38,
Volume 3, Part 2, 1999, Pages 2485-2563 (selected pages)
Baker, G. P. and B. J. Hall (2004), CEO Incentives and Firms Size, Journal of Labor Economics 22(4), 767-798
Eriksson, T. (1999), Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data, Journal of Labor Economics, vol 17(2), 262-80.
Niederle, M. and L. Vesterlund (2007), Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete too much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 1067-1101
Booth, A. L. (2009), Gender and competition, Labour Economics, Volume 16, Issue 6, December 2009, Pages 599-606.
Booth, A. L., M. Francesconi, and J. Frank (2003), A sticky floors model of promotion, pay, and gender,European Economic Review, vol 47: 295-322.
Bertrand, M., C. Goldin, and L.F. Katz (2010), Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Corporate and Financial Sectors, NBER Working Paper Series 14681, Cambridge MA. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(3): 228-55.
Adams, R. B. and D. Ferreira (2009), Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 94, November 2009, 291-309
Smith, N, Smith, V. and M. Verner (2006), Do women in top management affect firm performance? A panel study of 2,500 Danish firms, International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, 55 (7), 569-593
Matsa, D. and A. Miller (2010), A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas (July 6, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636047
Kurtulus, F. A. (2009), "The Effect of Heterogeneity on the Performance of Employees and Organizational Divisions of the Firm." Forthcoming in Industrial Relations.
Åslund, O. and O. Nordström-Skans (2010), "Will I see you at work? Ethnic workplace segregation in Sweden 1985-2002." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 63(3): 471-493.
Boschini, A. & A. Sjögren (2007): Is Team Formation Gender Neutral? Evidence from Coauthorship Patterns, Journal of Labor Economics, 25, 325-365.
Hamilton, B. H., J. A. Nickerson, and H. Owan (2003), "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation" Journal of Political Economy 111(3): 465-97.
Johansson, P. and M. Palme (2005), "Moral hazard and sickness insurance." Journal of Public Economics 89: 1879-1890.
Ichino, A. and R. Riphahn (2005), "The Effect of Employment Protection on Workers Effort: Absenteeism during and after Probation." Journal of the European Economic Association 3(1):120- 143.
Datta Gupta, N., and N. Kristensen (2008), "Work environment satisfaction and employee health: panel evidence from Denmark, France, and Spain, 1994-2001," European Journal of Health Economics 9(1): 51-61.
Eriksen-Jensen, T., Å-M Hansen og A. Høgh (2010), "The Costs of Workplace Bullying: An Economic Approach using the Matching Estimator" Manuscript
Mas, A. and E. Moretti (2009), "Peers at Work." American Economic Review 99(1): 112-145.
Hesselius, P., J. P. Nilsson and P. Johansson (2009), "Sick of your colleagues' absence?" Journal of the European Economic Association 7(2-3): 583-594.
Ciliberto, F., A. R. Miller, H. S. Nielsen and M. Simonsen (2010), "Playing the Fertility Game at work." Manuscript.
7-point grading scale (take-home assignment and oral exam)
Oral exam without preparation based on project report (20 min.). The weight of the oral exam is approx. 2/3 and the weight of the project report is approx. 1/3.
Examination aids allowed: Project report
